Covert timing channels provide a way to surreptitiously leak information from an entity in a higher-security level to an entity in a lower level. The difficulty of detecting or eliminating such channels makes them a desirable choice for adversaries that value stealth over throughput. When one considers the possibility of such channels transmitting information across network boundaries, the threat becomes even more acute. A promising technique for detecting covert timing channels focuses on using entropy-based tests. This method is able to reliably detect known covert timing channels by using a combination of entropy and conditional entropy to detect anomalies in shape and regularity, respectively. This dual approach is intended to make entropy-based detection robust against both current and future channels. In this work, we show that entropy-based detection can be defeated by a channel that intelligently and adaptively manipulates the metrics used for detection. Specifically, we propose a new passive covert channel that uses a portion of the inter-packet delays in a compromised stream to smooth out the shape distortions detected by the entropy test. As a passive channel, it is not as prone to regularity-based detection as previously proposed active channels. We introduce a model for analyzing the effect of our techniques on the entropy of the channel and empirically investigate the accuracy * Corresponding author 
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Introduction
Covert channels provide a way for an attacker to surreptitiously leak information from an entity in a higher-security level to an entity in a lower level.
Since these channels can compromise the confidentiality of sensitive secrets, blocking or at least detecting covert channels is an important security goal. In recent years, researchers have devoted substantial effort to studying networkbased covert timing channels. In these channels, a covert transmitter subtly manipulates the timing of packets to embed information that can be decoded by a covert receiver in a lower security area.
Network-based covert timing channels provide several important benefits to an attacker that values stealth. First, the channel can be embedded into a legitimate network stream, as exemplified by the Jitterbug covert channel [1] .
Thus, the attacker does not need to raise suspicions by initiating a network connection. Second, the content of packets do need not to be manipulated in any way, thereby minimizing the risk of detection through the analysis of headers or deep packet inspection. Third, the network destination of the stream need not be the covert receiver. In fact, the covert receiver could be positioned anywhere along the network path as long as it is able to observe the timing information.
Previous work on defending against covert timing channels has focused on either eliminating the possibility of a channel [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] or detecting the presence of a channel [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] . Eliminating the possibility of covert timing channels typically involves removing all of the timing information for a network stream by buffering the packets. Such schemes penalize all traffic, creating substantial delays for legitimate users. Therefore, detection is likely to be a more practical and preferable alternative. The presence of a covert timing channel is a strong indication that a network has been compromised.
Gianvecchio et. al. [11] propose a promising detection technique based on the entropy and conditional entropy of the distribution of a stream's timing information. They show that by using a combination of tests for channel regularity and shape, they can reliably detect all known timing channels. This dual approach is intended to make entropy-based detection robust against both current and future channels.
In this paper, we present the design for a more sophisticated covert timing channel that can evade all current detection tests. We show that even entropybased detection can be defeated by a channel that intelligently manipulates its traffic characteristics. Specifically, we propose Liquid, a covert channel that uses a portion of the inter-packet delays (IPDs) in a compromised stream to smooth out the distortions used by current detection tests. We demonstrate experimentally that our channel is able to evade detection while still maintaining acceptable capacity.
Not surprisingly, there is a trade off between detection resistance and capacity. To better understand this compromise, we introduce a model for analyzing the effect of our techniques on the entropy of the channel. Using this model, we develop a framework which we use to precisely set the parameters for Liquid.
We empirically validate the accuracy of the framework and show that using our framework, Liquid can be tuned to achieve any desired level of detection resistance.
We also compare Liquid to another intelligent timing channel design, the Model-Based Covert Timing Channel (MBCTC) [13] . We show that Liquid and MBCTC both evade shape-based detection, but that only Liquid evades regularity-based detection. In short, MBCTC was detected due to channel regularity in 100% of our tests after just 2,000 IPDs, while Liquid could not be detected more than 3% of the time after 60,000 IPDs.
Contributions. This paper describes the design of Liquid ( § 3), the first covert timing channel that can evade the best known detection methods for both shape and regularity. Liquid is novel, in that uses an adaptive technique to do distribution smoothing in real time on streams generated by legitimate users. A major contribution of this work in studying the effectiveness of Liquid is an analytic framework ( § 3.4), through which we can estimate the amount of entropy gained for the number of IPDs used for smoothing out the distortions. Additionally, we describe a set of network experiments and simulations ( § 4) that carefully evaluate the detection resistance of Liquid, Jitterbug, and MBCTC for up to 200,000 IPDs in some experiments ( § 5).
Background and Related Work
In this section, we first briefly describe some recent work in the design of covert channels, including Jitterbug and MBCTC, and then we explain how detection and especially entropy-based detection can uncover the presence of these channels in a network.
Network-Based Covert Timing Channels
We can classify network-based covert timing channels (CTCs) as either passive or active [11] . Passive CTCs do not generate any additional network traffic.
Instead they use the IPDs of legitimate streams to encode the message. Conversely, active channels create their own network stream with specially crafted IPDs. Intuitively, passive channels are harder to detect since the attacker does not have to initiate a network connection; however, their capacity is dependent on the co-opted stream.
Jitterbug
Shah et al. proposed using a small hardware device to create a passive covert timing channel [1] . This device, referred to as a Jitterbug, sits like an adapter between a machine and its keyboard. This placement allows it to selectively capture and delay each key stroke made by the machine's user. In interactive network applications, the timing information of key strokes could potentially be used to affect the timing information of the actual network stream. Jitterbug was designed to exploit this property in order to embed CTCs into these streams. One such network application is SSH. In the interactive mode of SSH, every keystroke in a terminal causes a packet to be sent immediately [14] . An interesting advantage of using a Jitterbug is that the actual machine is never compromised and, as a result, scanning the machine would not reveal its presence.
Jitterbug uses a timing window w to determine the delay required for encoding each symbol. The timing window is set so as to balance the number of errors that are caused by network jitter and channel capacity. Furthermore, Jitterbug uses a pseudo-random sequence, s, so that the IPDs do not cluster around multiples of w. Each value in s is in the range [0, w − 1].
In the case of a binary code, a Jitterbug encodes the symbols by delaying a key stroke such that the resulting IPD satisfies the following equation: 
Model Based Covert Timing Channel
The covert channel design most similar to that of Liquid is the Model Based Covert Timing Channel (MBCTC) proposed by Gianvecchio et al. [13] . The authors developed a framework for creating an active CTC that attempts to mimic the statistical properties of legitimate network streams [13] . The framework is used to create a model of legitimate traffic, which in turn helps determine the properties of MBCTC. In order to construct the MBCTC, they first analyze a target type of traffic and fit that traffic to a distribution. The message is then split into symbols that are mapped to IPDs based on the inverse distribution function of the chosen distribution. Finally, packets are sent using the calculated IPDs. Decoding is performed using the cumulative distribution function. The distribution can be changed over time to reflect any changes in the target traffic.
In Section 5, we provide a direct comparison between Liquid and MBCTC.
Other Channels
The Storage IP Simple Covert Channel, proposed by Cabuk et al. [15] , uses a simple binary encoding scheme in which the channel transmits a bit by sending (or not sending) a packet in a given time interval. The Timing IP Simple Covert Channel (Timing IP SCC) uses a predetermined mapping of symbols to specific IPD values [15] . Messages are broken up into these symbols and a stream is created with the corresponding IPDs. Watermarking is used to associate a target network stream with a sender by embedding a recognizable pattern into the IPDs of the stream [16, 17, 18] . It is different from traditional timing channels in that the objective is not to leak captured information, but to correlate streams across multiple hops. Watermarking has been used both to track users across anonymous networks [16] and to trace back attackers through stepping stone connections [17] .
Defense Against Covert Channels
Defenses against covert timing channels can be categorized as either prevention or detection techniques. Prevention is concerned with either eliminating the possibility of a channel or reducing the channel's capacity and thus rendering it impractical. On the other hand, detection techniques attempt to passively identify covert channels currently in use.
Kemmerer proposed the use of a Shared Resource Matrix to help identify resources and entities that could potentially be utilized by covert channels [7, 6] .
This matrix is intended to be used at design time to assist system architects when creating multi-level secure systems. Hu [3] suggested the use of adding noise to system clocks to reduce the capacity of a timing channel. A more aggressive prevention technique, the Pump, was proposed in [4, 5] . The Pump is placed between two processes so that any communication between them can be intercepted and re-sent based on a randomization scheme to perturb timing information. Fisk et al. [2] used Active Wardens to remove storage channels from objects that have strict format definitions. These definitions allow the content of the objects to be objectively verified. A practical example of such an object would be the packet header definition of a network protocol.
Burke et al. [9, 8] investigated a simple statistical method for detecting covert timing channels. This method assumes that the IPDs for a network stream roughly fit a normal distribution; a stream with a bimodal or multi-modal distribution would therefore suggest the presence of a covert timing channel. Thus, the method was among the first to focus on irregularities in the shape of IPD distribution.
Cabuk et al. [10] designed a detection method based on the variance of IPDs in a network stream. For a legitimate stream, the variation would be expected to change over time. This technique was the first to exploit the regularity of streams with active covert channels, in which packets are generated with the same distribution over time. Generating a stream for an active covert channel without regularity may be possible, but we are not aware of any covert channel that does so.
Cabuk et al. also created a shape-based detection technique called Sigma
Similarity; this method sorts the IPDs for a network stream in order of increasing size and attempts to find large relative differences between them [10] . A large percentage of relative differences below some value Sigma suggests the use of a CTC. Stillman [12] proposes finding correlations between the IPDs of a network stream and the memory content on a compromised machine in order to detect CTCs.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
Gianvecchio et al. [11] use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS Test) to check if the distribution of a sample set of IPDs matched that of a legitimate set of IPDs. A difference in the distributions would suggest the presence of a CTC in the sample. The KS Test is a non-parametric test that can be used to determine if two samples are from the same distribution. One major advantage of this test is that it does not rely on any assumptions in regards to the actual distribution of the samples.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, D, quantifies the maximum distance between the empirical distribution functions of the two samples.
Since the KS Test directly compares the empirical distribution functions, the samples do not need to be the same size.
Entropy Based Detection
Gianvecchio et al. [11] propose using the entropy and conditional entropy of a network stream to detect covert timing channels. Entropy could be used to detect timing channels that caused differences in the shape of a channel, whereas conditional entropy could be used to detect the regularity of a channel. They postulated that a combination of these two metrics would be effective against known timing channels and robust against future channels. They showed that entropy-based detection could be used to detect well-known timing channels such as Timing IP SCC (referred to as IPCTC in [11] ) and the Jitterbug CTC.
Entropy Given a sample of sequential IPDs from a network stream, each IPD can be mapped to one of a finite set of M possible symbols, with the probability of the i th symbol given as P i . The entropy, H, of the sample is then calculated as [19] :
It follows from this equation that the entropy is maximized when all of the symbols are equally likely, i.e. P i = 1 M for all i. Conversely, the entropy is minimized (zero) when only symbol is possible.
To use entropy to detect covert timing channels, there must be a difference in symbol probabilities between the covert and legitimate streams such that the difference results in decreased entropy for the covert stream. This is clearly true in the case of Timing IP SCC, because only two IPD values are used to encode the covert message. Since each IPD value maps to only one symbol, only two symbols are used for the hidden message -much fewer than would be expected in a legitimate stream. Consequently, the probability for all the other symbols in the Timing IP SCC stream is near zero.
The only way to ensure that this probability difference results in a loss of entropy for the covert stream is by mapping IPDs to symbols in such a way that a legitimate stream's entropy is maximal. Gianvecchio et al. accomplish this by constructing a histogram of IPDs with M bins corresponding to the M possible symbols. They set the ranges of the bins using a large training set of IPDs such that each bin has an equal number of training IPDs, resulting in each symbol having equal probability. If the IPDs of a legitimate stream are binned using the histogram, they would be expected to have a nearly uniform distribution among the bins. Since all symbols are equally likely, the entropy is maximal.
To detect the presence of a covert timing channel, samples of IPDs are tested to see if their entropy is lower than that of a legitimate stream. The entropy of each sample is calculated using the equation given above, with the probability of each symbol defined as the number of occurrences of that symbol within the sample divided by the sample size. This entropy test is effective in detecting the Jitterbug CTC, which is not detectable using the KS test or other shape-based detection schemes due to the small changes it adds to the IPDs of an otherwise legitimate stream.
Conditional Entropy. The effectiveness of using entropy to detect covert Given a sequence of symbols (bin numbers) X, such that X i is the i th value in the sequence, the conditional entropy of symbol
Corrected Entropy. Due to problems with limited sample sizes, Gianvecchio et al. advance the use of corrected entropy (CEN) instead of entropy. CEN is calculated as follows:
where perc(X 1 ) is the percentage of training bins that contain exactly one IPD from the test sample. As we will see in the following sections and in Section 5, this value plays a significant role in detecting covert channels.
They similarly use corrected conditional entropy (CCE) instead of conditional entropy:
where perc(X i ) is the percentage of unique subsequences of symbols of length i.
For the remainder of this paper, we shorten the notation perc(X 1 ) to perc for simplicity.
The Design of Liquid
The design goal for Liquid was to create a passive timing channel that could successfully evade detection by all of the currently known tests, with a particular focus on defeating entropy-based detection. We decided to use the Jitterbug CTC as a base for Liquid due to its unique attack vector, and because, to the best of our knowledge, it successfully evades all detection methods except the corrected entropy test. In particular, as a passive timing channel, Jitterbug has alreadby been shown to evade the corrected condidtional entropy test [11] .
The intuition behind Liquid is to use some portion of the IPDs in a compromised stream to smooth out the symbol probability distortions detected by the corrected entropy test. The intended result is that the probability of each symbol present in the stream will be approximately equal, maximizing the entropy H. In addition maximizing the entropy, we would also like to increase the number of bins that contain exactly one sample IPD, thereby increasing the value of perc. We can see from Equation 2 that increasing the value of perc will result in a higher CEN value.
Liquid, like Jitterbug, is a passive covert timing channel, and as such it does not generate any additional traffic. This means that Liquid can only modify
IPDs by adding additional delay to outgoing packets. Intuitively, delaying a single packet P i changes two different IPDs; the IPD between packets P i−1 and P i increases, while the IPD between packets P i and P i+1 decreases. We denote these delays as IP D i−1 and IP D i , respectively. This means that it is possible for Liquid to send both small and large shaping IPDs by only delaying packets. We can illustrate this property with a simple example.
Given the unmodified legitimate stream depicted in Figure 1 (a), we can see that the inter-packet delays between P 1 , P 2 , and
If we delay P 2 by one time unit such that it is now sent at time t = 4(see Furthermore, large delays can cause succeeding packets to be buffered, reducing the inter-packet delay to near zero. This is shown in Figure 1 
Shaping IPDs
The additional delay added for each shaping IPD is dependent on the current symbol probabilities of the channel. In order to estimate these probabilities,
Liquid maintains a set of equally probable bins similar to those used in entropybased detection. The number of bins is set to match that of the entropy test and the bin ranges are predetermined using a large set of legitimate training
IPDs. During operation Liquid determines the bin for each IPD (both transmit and shaping) that has already been sent and keeps track of the count for each bin. Using the current bin counts, Liquid chooses the shaping IPDs in a way that minimizes the following:
In other words, Liquid adds between 0 and w milliseconds of additional delay to place each shaping IPD in the bin with the smallest count in the reachable range. Liquid can also periodically reset the count for each bin to be more sensitive to the current conditions of the channel.
Liquid Cycle
In Liquid we refer to a sequence of N t transmit IPDs followed by a sequence of N s shaping IPDs as a cycle. 
Using H t , we derive an equation that estimates the entropy of an entire Liquid cycle, H l . Liquid attempts to add entropy by using a sequence of shaping IPDs.
We refer to this additional entropy as H s . However, adding the shaping IPDs changes the probabilities of all the symbols generated in the transmit sequence, which consequently affects the value of H t . We denote this new value as H t . The entropy of a Liquid cycle can written as the sum of the shaping and transmit entropies:
If we assume that Liquid will always be able to find an empty bin to place each of the shaping IPDs, we can then directly calculate H s and H t to find an upper bound on the amount of entropy we can add to the channel. This upper bound is a reasonable estimate given that the corrected entropy test uses a large number of bins and a relatively small sample size. The default implementation of the corrected entropy test uses 2 16 bins, but a sample size of only 2000 IPDs.
We test the accuracy of this estimate in section 5.
Since each shaping IPD is placed in an empty bin, we can say that each will result in a new symbol i with the probability:
Substituting the equation for the symbol probabilities (5), into the equation for entropy (1), H s can be calculated as follows:
Due to the assumption that none of the shaping IPDs will be placed bins already containing transmit IPDs, the probability of each symbol in the transmit sequence will be reduced by a factor of x, where:
We can use x along with Equation 1 to calculate H t :
We can substitute the equations for H s and H t into Equation 4 to calculate the entropy of the Liquid cycle:
Even though we have Equation 7 to describe H l , in order to calculate the corrected entropy we still need to calculate the value of perc for the Liquid cycle.
This is done as follows:
Finally, using Equation 2 with H l and perc l we can calculate the corrected entropy of the Liquid cycle as:
Experimental Setup
In this section, we detail the experimental setup we used to validate the detection resistance of Liquid. First we describe how we selected the inter-packet delays used for creating the Jitterbug, Liquid, and Legitimate test samples.
We then describe the method we used to create network streams using those samples. Finally, we describe how we performed detection.
Data Selection
All of the IPDs used in our experiments were collected using network traces acquired from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. We chose to use SSH IPDs since SSH was the protocol used by Shah et al. for Jitterbug [1] and by Gianvecchio et al. for entropy-based detection [11] . To select only SSH IPDs from the network traces, we isolated the SSH streams using the destination port number. Since Jitterbug modulates keystroke timing, we only used streams where the SSH server was the destination. The source and destination IP addresses were used to disaggregate overlapping streams and create a sequence Most of the IPDs in the sample set are smaller than 5 seconds; however, a small percentage of the IPDs are significantly larger. As such, we set the maximum value for each IPD in the test sets at 120 seconds to allow the experiments to finish in a reasonable amount of time.
Creating the Test Traffic
To simulate a user typing, we created a software application that would send keystrokes directly to an SSH session. The time between each successive keystroke was based a sequence of input IPDs. We refer to this sequence of input IPDs as a test sample. Each test sample was comprised of correlated IPDs taken from the SampleSet. To directly compare the differences between Legitimate, Jitterbug, and Liquid traffic, each test sample was used as the base input sequence for all three types of traffic. In the case of Legitimate traffic, the test sample was sent unchanged. For Jitterbug and Liquid, the test sample was first modified to embed a covert message. We used multiple sets of samples to explore the effect of different parameters and scenarios on the detection scores. Each test set, unless otherwise specified, was created using 100 samples consisting of 2000 IPDs each.
We set the Jitterbug and Liquid parameters to match what was used by Gianvecchio et al. for their study of entropy-based detection [11] . The timing window w was set to be 20ms and the length of the rotate sequence s was set to be equal to the sample size of 2000 IPDs. For Liquid, we tested various values of N s and N t and their effect on achieving different levels of detection resistance.
We also ran Liquid test sets both with and without sub-millisecond noise injected into the transmit IPDs. Recall from Section 3 that the Liquid transmit
IPDs are encoded exactly like Jitterbug when transmit noise is not used. Removing the transmit noise allows us to more directly examine the effect of the shaping IPDs.
Detection
The sender was located inside of our network and the receiver was an external SSH server. The IPDs were captured at two locations, local and remote. Local was at the sender itself and remote was four hops away at the edge of the network. The IPDs captured at the local capture point are only perturbed by the processes on the sending machine itself. This serves as a worst case detection scenario for the covert channel (i.e. a best case for the detector) since there is no network jitter to help distort the intended IPDs. The remote location was chosen so as to mimic a likely detection scenario in a real-world situation.
We ran the corrected entropy, corrected conditional entropy, and KolmogorovSmirnov tests on each captured sample of Legitimate, Jitterbug, and Liquid IPDs. Each test was performed, offline, i.e. after a complete sample of IPDs had been captured and parsed. The resulting test scores for the Legitimate IPDs were used to create a cutoff score for each of the detection tests. To achieve a one percent false positive rate, the 1 st percentile was used for the corrected entropy test, while the 99 th percentile was used for the corrected conditional entropy and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. We note that a one percent false positive rate was also used by Gianvecchio et al. [11] , and it represents a point at which the number of false positives would already be quite high in a system with many legitimate streams due to the base rate fallacy [20] . Any sample with a CEN value below the cutoff score would be consider covert. Similarly, any sample with a CCE or KS value above the respective cutoff scores would also be considered covert. For each test, we calculated the detection rate for both Jitterbug and Liquid. This process was performed separately for both the local and remote detection sites.
For the Liquid samples, we rotated the values of N t and N s in the range [1.
.
3] such that
Nt Ns ≈ 1. In this way, the Liquid cycle would consist of as few as 2, or as many as 6 IPDS, with the number changing over time. We rotated between small values of N t and N s so that a detection scheme would be unable to easily distinguish between the IPDs used for transmission and those used for shaping. Otherwise, such a scheme could ignore all IPDs used for shaping and completely negate their effect. To further increase the detection resistance of Liquid, we implemented transmit noise.
Experimental Results
In this section, we empirically evaluate the accuracy of the estimation equations presented in Section 3. We also compare the detection resistance of Liquid, Jitterbug, and MBCTC. We explore the effect of the size of the test set on Liquid's CEN detection resistance and discuss Liquid's channel capacity. Finally, we present the IPD bin frequencies of Legitimate, Jitterbug, and Liquid IPDs to provide insight into how Liquid evades detection.
Estimating the Effect of Shaping
We first explore the accuracy of our estimation framework as presented in Section 3, and we then use those equations to estimate the values of N s and N t needed to achieve certain levels of detection resistance. For these experiments, we implemented Liquid implemented without sub-millisecond transmit noise so that the behavior of the Liquid transmit IPDs would exactly match that of original Jitterbug. This provides us with a clearer picture of the effect that shaping IPDs have on the entropy of the channel. 
. Accuracy of the Estimation Framework
To test the accuracy of our estimation framework, we embedded Liquid into each sample of our test set such that the first 1000 IPDs were for transmission and the following 1000 IPDs were for shaping. For each sample, we calcu- Table 2 shows the accuracy of the estimation framework for samples of 2000
Liquid IPDs; CEN l and perc s are averages over these samples. We can see that the actual corrected entropy is 0.52 bits lower than the estimated value. This difference can be attributed to the assumption that each shaping IPD will be put into an empty bin, i.e. perc s = 1.0, whereas the average value of perc s is actually 0.91. As mentioned in Section 3.4, these equations in our model provide an upper bound on the value of CEN.
Estimating the Number of Shaping IPDs
We used the equations given in Section 3.4 to estimate the values of N s and N t needed for Liquid to evade CEN detection 99, 75, and 50 percent of the time.
We assumed that detection would be performed using samples of 2000 IPDs.
We first ran a test set of Legitimate IPDs and found the detection cutoff score, CEN cutof f , at which we would get a 1% false positive rate. We then ran a test set of Liquid transmit IPDs and recorded the entropy H t and the percentage of singular bins perc t for each sample. 
We added the value from Table 2 to the corrected entropy cutoff score to account for any error in our estimation equations. The estimated values for N t and N s are listed in Table 3 .
To test the accuracy of our estimations, we ran the corrected entropy test on 150 samples of Liquid and calculated the actual evasion rates (i.e. the false negative rates). Table 3 to provide a would-be attacker with enough information to evade detection at any target level while maintaining maximal throughput.
Detection Resistance
We ran 100 samples of Legitimate, Jitterbug, and Liquid traffic, capturing the IPDs at the local and remote detection locations, as discussed in Section 4.3.
For MBCTC, we used simulated IPD values. We implemented Liquid with submillisecond transmit noise, and we use this version of Liquid for the remaining experiments in this section. Both CEN and CCE detection were performed on each sample.
Cutoff scores for the CCE and CEN tests are shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. We calculated values for both the local and remote detection sites.
Any sample with a CEN value less than or equal to the CEN cutoff score would be considered covert. Conversely, any sample with a corrected conditional entropy score greater than or equal to the CCE cutoff score would be considered covert. We calculated the cutoff scores for each test so as to achieve a false positive rate of 0.01 or 0.10, as indicated in the figures. We used a 0.10 false positive rate for the corrected entropy test at the remote site so that we could achieve a better detection rate for Jitterbug.
The test scores and detection rates for the Legitimate, Jitterbug, Liquid, and MBCTC samples are also shown in Figures 3 and 4 . Note that the detection rate of the Legitimate samples is the false positive rate, as labeled in the figures.
We can see from Figure 3 that the average CCE values for Jitterbug and Liquid are slightly above that of Legitimate traffic but significantly below the detection threshold. This difference is not detectable without a prohibitively high false positive rate. Note that the CCE detection rate for Jitterbug and Liquid is no more than 2% at either the local or remote sites. MBCTC, on the other hand, has an average CCE value that is well above the cutoff threshold.
The CCE test is able to achieve a 100% detection rate of MBCTC. As discussed in Section 2, the fact that MBCTC is an active covert channel means that it is difficult to remove regularity.
We can see from Figure 4 Note that, as MBCTC is an active covert channel, it has complete freedom to shape the channel to match the expected distribution. Liquid, being a passive covert channel, trades off between detection and channel capacity; nevertheless, at only 2% detection, CEN is far from effective.
We also ran the KS test on the Liquid samples. Our results showed a 0% detection rate for Liquid using a 1% false positive cutoff value. Gianvecchio et.
al. showed in [11] and [13] that Jitterbug and MBCTC are undetectable by the KS test.
Our results show that Jitterbug and MBCTC are detectable using entropybased detection. Liquid, however, is detected at most 2% of the time. Since we set N t and N s such that half of the IPDs in each sample were used for shaping, we can say that our channel achieved near complete detection resistance while only reducing the channel capacity by half. Figure 5 shows the effect of test sample size on the CEN detection resistance of Liquid. The sample size was varied from 2,000 IPDs to 60,000 IPDs. We can infer from Figure 5 that the size of the test sample has little effect on the detection resistance of Liquid. With a 1% false positive threshold the CEN test did not have detection rate higher than 3%. With a 10% false positive threshold the detection rate stayed at or below 12%. In fact, the average entropy values for both Legitimate and Liquid IPDs stayed relatively constant. This is evidence that there is no trivial modification to CEN that would allow it to successfully detect Liquid.
Test Sample Size

Channel Capacity
We have demonstrated that Liquid evades detection when half of the available IPDs are used for shaping and half are used to transmit the hidden message.
Thus, Liquid can operate with 50% of the channel capacity of Jitterbug. Since Liquid, like Jitterbug, is a passive channel, the bandwidth is determined entirely by the underlying network stream. Using our samples, in which the underlying stream is SSH, we found that Liquid sent approximately 2.81 IPDs/second.
Thus an attacker could transmit the hidden message at roughly 1.4 bits/second with little risk of detection. We note that since Liquid evades detection for more than 60,000 IPDs, the attacker can safely send much more data than with any network-based covert timing channel we have discovered in the literature.
Bin Frequency
As we detail in Section 3, the entropy of a stream is maximized when all of the possible symbols are equally likely. The corrected entropy test uses a histogram of IPDs with bins corresponding to the possible symbols. The bin ranges are constructed in such a way that, for Legitimate samples, each symbol would be equally likely, maximizing the entropy. Figure 6 shows the count of each bin for 200,000 IPDs of different types. As we can see from Figure 6 (a), the count of the bins for the Legitimate IPDs is roughly uniform. Figure 6(b) shows that the Jitterbug IPDs heavily cluster around a small set of bins. This clustering is easily detected by the corrected entropy test. Figure 6 (c) show the histogram for Liquid; the histogram appears to be roughly uniform, with a few high count bins. We can attribute these minor bin discrepancies to the transmit IPDs of Liquid. However, they are much less pronounced than we see in Jitterbug, and consequently undetectable for smaller samples.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed Liquid, a passive covert timing channel that uses a portion of the inter-packet delays in a compromised stream to smooth out the distortions that make it possible to detect other covert timing channels.
We designed our channel to alternate, in an unpredictable way, between transmitting the hidden message and shaping the channel's timing distribution to evade detection. Liquid is the first covert channel to apply distribution shaping to a passive covert channel. Since the timing distribution of a passive covert channel cannot be predicted in advance, Liquid adapts its shaping throughout the lifetime of the stream to continually maximize its evasion based on shape.
As a passive covert channel, Liquid has natural resistance to detection based on regularity. By avoiding unusual characteristics in either shape or regularity, Liquid effectively evades all known detection techniques.
We found that the number of inter-packet delays used for shaping versus the number used for transmitting the message is an important consideration when trying to balance detection resistance and capacity. To better understand this trade-off, we introduced a set of equations to estimate the effects of our techniques on the entropy of the channel. We then used those equations to estimate the channel parameters needed to obtain certain levels of detection resistance. We empirically showed that when Liquid used the estimated parameters, it was able to approximately meet (and sometimes exceed) the target levels of detection resistance.
We then evaluated the detection rates of various tests against Liquid, MBCTC, and Jitterbug. We showed that only Liquid was able to evade entropy-based detection. We also demonstrated that Liquid was effective regardless of the test sample size.
By smoothing out the distribution used for detection without using an active covert channel, Liquid creates a new challenge for the detection of covert timing channels. Any future detection schemes must consider the attacker's ability to manipulate distributions to evade detection at the cost of decreased throughput.
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